We just received a memo from Retired Army Lieutenant Colonel Lon Cross, detailing the specifics of how we can successfully and safely withdraw all of our troops from Iraq within 6-8 months. Colonel Cross is not affiliated with the campaign, but as a citizen and a retired Army officer who has worked heavily in logistics, he wanted to share this with Governor Richardson.

From: US Army (Ret.) LTC Lon Cross
Sent: Friday, November 09, 2007 7:49 AM
To: Richardson Senior Staff
Subject: Re: Redeploying troops in Iraq

The conventional wisdom on Iraq is wrong. In recent months, politicians from both sides of the aisle have scoffed at the notion that US Forces could conduct a complete and safe withdrawal from Iraq in a matter of months. Most of these critiques have been "myth based," short on facts and long on conjecture driven by the critic's personal political agenda.

It is not my intention to weigh the merits of the competing redeployment proposals with respect to which is most strategically and politically sound. In the succeeding paragraphs, I will draw upon my knowledge as a retired field-grade infantry and logistics officer, and will present the facts that are relevant to an evaluation of what is logistically feasible regarding the redeployment of US Forces from Iraq.

For the sake of brevity, when making the case as to what is logistically supportable, I will only address the proposal with the most aggressive timeline, which is Governor Bill Richardson's call for a complete redeployment within six to eight months. As the evidence below will show, this scenario is very much achievable.

Here's how: despite the myth being propagated that there is only one route into and out of Iraq, there are actually seven land routes.

These routes include: four that lead to the Kuwaiti ports, including the main expressway from Baghdad to Umm Qasr as well as a highway that rolls along the Tigris to Umm Qasr, and two highways that cut through Saudi Arabia into Kuwait. In addition, there is a viable rail option in the north into Turkey (the Army Corps of Engineers has upgraded the line), as well as the expressway north into Turkey and one that leads into Jordan.

Therefore, depending on what we can expect in the way of political support from neighboring countries, we can reasonably assume between four and seven land routes out of Iraq.

Next comes the question of what has to traverse those routes, and there are three primary logistics problems to solve. First, there are some 50,000 pieces of rolling stock -- vehicles, both combat and non-combat, such as tanks and Humvees, that can propel themselves out of Iraq. A simple division of 50,000 by six or eight months shows that we would need to withdraw an average of, respectively, 274 or 205 vehicles per day.

Second, there are some 200,000 Short Tons (2000 pounds per Short Ton) of unit equipment and supplies that will require being carted into containers and shipped out. This number is actually a conservative estimate, but it also gives lie to the second myth about a future redeployment: we do not need to bring back everything we brought to Iraq.

To be sure, these 200,000 Short Tons include all weapons, ammunition, and sensitive items. But it leaves behind fixed-assets such as barracks and gymnasiums. Risking even a single troop's life through delay in order to break these assets down brick-by-brick would be a travesty.

The 200,000 Short Tons would then be broken down and placed on 40-foot containers that will transport 15 Short Tons each. Thus, it would take some 13,333 containers to remove all of our necessary stationary equipment from Iraq. Again, this is quite doable, with a six-month redeployment requiring 73 containers per day, and eight months requiring 55.

Finally, we must of course account for the brave men and women who are serving in Iraq right now. These troops represent both the most important and the easiest of the logistics equation, as many would be integrated as security into the convoys that will bring the equipment home. Additionally, a fleet of C-130s, C-17s, and civilian jet liners could assist by air, as is currently done to transport most troops.

Combined, then, US Forces would need to redeploy a sum total of 347 and 260 moveable units daily (for the six and eight month scenarios, respectively). Moreover, in reality, these two flows need not be mutually exclusive. Some portion of the 200,000 Short Tons may be moved by the rolling stock fleet. For here, however, I am going to treat these two numbers as discrete so as to provide the analysis for a more conservative time-line.

Assuming that we employed as few as three of the seven available roads every day in order to maintain tactical surprise, the redeployment would require moving 116 or 87 vehicles per path, per day. This task is quite achievable by a military that moved half a million troops and accompanying equipment out of Iraq in four months following the first Gulf War.

I am not qualified to speak as to what the best course of action in Iraq would be, though, like all Americans, I have my opinions. I do know, however, what is possible, and a safe and complete redeployment of all American forces within six to eight months is, without question, achievable.

Below I have included more details and specifics about the redeployment for your information.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Lon Cross is a Research Fellow at LMI (formerly known as
the Logistics Management Institute) where he specializes in Logistics and
Supply Chain Risk Management and Process Improvement. Currently, all of his
clients reside within the Department of Defense. Lon is a retired Army Lieutenant
Colonel. He took part in drafting the 82nd Airborne Division's Operations
Orders for Operation Urgent Fury, the 1983 invasion of Grenada, as well as
the re-equipping of a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division following the
first Persian Gulf War. He holds an undergraduate degree from Dartmouth College
and a MBA from the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.